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pline one into being organized; and
fasting is good for one’s health (Yı l m a z
et al. 1997–9). Not only does rationaliz-
ing religion bring the classes into line
with the more conventionally secular
subjects, such as chemistry and nature
study (Starret 1998); it also paves the
way for the interpretation that secular-
ism and Islam complement each other.
Because secularism is not atheism, it
cannot be against Islam and because
Islam is a rational religion with com-
mitment to freedom, it embodies the principles of secularism anyway.
Because it does not mean atheism, it is a principle that guarantees the
protection of pure piety in the face of bigotry (ibid.). 
Furthermore, secularism is repeatedly explained as separation of re-
ligious affairs from state affairs, the state’s equal distance from all be-
lief systems, protection of people’s religious and moral freedoms, pre-
vention of abuse of religion in political affairs, and a prerequisite of
modernization/westernization (ibid.). Yet the same texts avoid dealing
with the existence of a directorate of religious affairs within the state or
the o b l i g a t i o n to attend the religion classes. Kaplan (1996) concludes
that children are not ‘expected to question the incongruity between
freedom of conscience and mandatory religion lessons in primary and
secondary school’. 
Sanctifying the modern nation
Textbooks for religion classes in Turkey can also be said to have be-
come a medium in which nationalism and militarism are inculcated. To
give a very crude numeric example, the one-hundred-page fifth grade
primer has twenty pages on love of homeland in addition to six pages
on Ataturk, laicism, and Islam; whereas the second longest chapter is
on belief in prophets, with twelve pages. This is a feature repeated in
all textbooks with varying degrees of emphasis. 
In fact, the sacredness of protecting the homeland is an overwhelm-
ing theme that finds its way into many seemingly irrelevant sections
such as ‘nice habits’ or ‘social responsibilities’ as well as more overt
topics such as homeland, patriotism, history of wars, etc. Homeland
and the Turkish flag are frequently associated with the blood of sol-
diers who died in wars with enemies (Yı l m a z et al. 1997–9). This, then,
is tied into the sacredness of universal conscription. Because ‘protect-
ing the homeland from all kinds of attacks is a sacred responsibility’, ‘it
is improper for a Turkish man to evade conscription or avoid joining
the army using various excuses’ (ibid.). 
Yet the climax comes when the military and the army banners are
listed among the ‘sacred values’ that require reverence. The military as
an institution is given the venerable responsibility of protecting the
homeland against enemies, who are elusively defined in terms of ‘in-
ternal and external’ threats. Yet the texts do not stop there. They go on
to transform the army into a sacred value to be fought for: ‘the Turkish
army is our most valuable wealth, composed of the sons of this home-
land, enabling our nation to live in security. Our army is the insur-
E d u c a t i o n
Universal religious education, which
every Turkish citizen receives in school
for five to eight years, is a relatively
under-researched aspect of studies on
the state and Islam in Turkey. Litera-
ture on the topic usually discusses
classes on religion in the contempo-
rary context in two distinct ways. On
the one hand, the introduction of reli-
gion classes into the curricula is seen
as a major compromise from Kemalist
secularism – that is to say, it is dis-
cussed as an important representation of the radical shift from the sec-
ular ideals of the early republican period, which the notion of the Turk-
ish-Islamic synthesis, overtly adopted in the 1980s, brought about. On
the other hand, several writers explicitly argue that compulsory reli-
gion classes, together with other legal and institutional practices such
as those of the Directorate of Religious Affairs, reveal that secularism in
Turkey has not necessarily been about the separation of sacred and
secular spheres, but rather a state control over acceptable definitions
and practices of religion (Parla 1992, T a r h a n l ı 1993). 
However, describing the secular practice in Turkey as state control
over the religious sphere – and universal schooling in religion as a
manifestation of this phenomenon – is a correct but insufficient expla-
nation. The textbooks for classes on religion and morality take up ideas
of nationhood, homeland, Ataturk, militarism, secularism, economic
and political solidarity, and orderliness as much as, and sometimes
more than, pillars of Islam and religious belief in general. The state
functionalizes religion and attempts to use it as a terrain to legitimize
other ideologies. Ultimately it involves a larger process of socialization,
reaffirming some of the basic premises of the republic.
Secularizing religion
A publication of the Ministry of Education, Din Ögretiminde Yeni Yak-
l a s i m l a r (2000), which addresses teachers, gives instructions for the
‘new approaches’ in religious training through several articles written
by ‘specialists’ designated by the ministry. The preface self-appoints
the book as the guide that teachers should consult both in their gener-
al practices of teaching and also in understanding what religious in-
struction involves. It is said that if this aspect of education is neglected,
there is the danger of ‘others’ ‘brainwashing’ the students. These im-
plicit ‘others’ are in fact pervasive beliefs in society that religious edu-
cation ‘enables students to contemplate about’ through its provision
of the ‘correct’ information about religion and its ability to raise the
consciousness of students. As a result, precisely because religious in-
struction is transformed into ordered knowledge that requires special-
ization, it becomes the state’s responsibility to undertake its teaching
as ‘not all parents, not all families, can do this, or know enough them-
selves about religion’.
Naturally, it is not much of a new discovery to say that Islam and its
rituals are rationalized extensively in these books. For example, in this
context ablution helps keep one sufficiently clean; daily prayers disci-
In the debates on the issue of secularism and
Islam the Turkish Republic is often mentioned
as an example of how a Muslim society can be
governed by secular principles. Secularism
implies the separation of religion and state.
A careful reading of textbooks used in
universal religious education reveal that
Turkish secularism does not only entail state
control over the meaning of religion, but that
religion is also used to promote nationalism,
militarism, and the existing economic order.
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mountable guard of our state, flag, independence’ (ibid.). Hence an or-
ganization that would conventionally be seen as part of a secular na-
tion-state framework is turned into a holy institution that protects ven-
erable assets – and therefore is one itself. In his study of the eighth-
grade civic book, Kaplan (1996) notes how the state is depicted as a sa-
cred institution: ‘the state from the religious point of view is an institu-
tion that Allah created for mankind’s benefit.’ The sacralization of the
army reinforces this veneration with a militarized nuance. 
Capitalizing social harmony
Just like the unquestioned premises of security and need for protec-
tion, societal peace is also a major preoccupation of these books. Sta-
bility and harmonious relations among people are naturalized by re-
sembling this state of affairs to the way the rest of nature functions
(Yı l m a z et al. 1997–9). Kaplan (1996) argues that to the Turkish state
pedagogue, education is the means to impress a national culture that
can ensure social stability. The promotion of stability is especially sig-
nificant in a context where ethnic and socio-economic conflicts are in-
creasingly part of the agenda. Thus, any value that is promoted is
somehow linked with the maintenance of social peace and stability. 
One way in which this is done is by the promotion of Platonic division
of labour: ‘the peace and safety of a society depends on the harmo-
nious work of people – who serve in different institutions and organi-
zations of the society – within the division of labour. If people do not
undertake their share of the responsibilities in a consistent manner,
the order of society will be disrupted’ (Yı l m a z et al. 1997–9). The
groups cited as forming integral parts of this totality are women as
mothers, men as fathers, children as helpers of mothers and fathers,
factory workers who are to complete their work in the best way possi-
ble, state officials who have to work in a timely fashion and in harmony
with their managers, entrepreneurs, and traders who are supposed to
earn money and spend it through h e l a l means, and soldiers and police
forces that are given the responsibility to protect the country’s ‘indivis-
ible wholeness’ (ibid.).
Relevantly, a section in the sixth-grade textbook begins with a dis-
cussion of how one can attain happiness by believing in and exercising
the pillars of Islam. Then students are introduced to the concept of
happiness as something that is beyond material well-being: ‘for exam-
ple, a poor person may look for happiness in material wealth because
he assumes his misery is a result of his material deficiency. This may be
partially true, too. If a poor person reached material relief and if his/her
material needs were met, he may be happy. Yet, this happiness even-
tually fades away’ (ibid.). This is followed by a discussion on the vice of
jealousy. Jealousy is described in terms of coveting the more prosper-
ous, the more successful, and the more beautiful. The basic moral is
that one has to try to imitate and learn from others instead of wrongly
craving for the their belongings. In a context of incrementally increas-
ing income inequalities, exacerbated by frequent economic and politi-
cal crises, this can be taken to be timely moral advice – the internaliza-
tion of which may be hoped to diminish chances of social uprising. If it
is possible to instruct children into thinking ‘one needs to work very
hard to become rich’ (ibid.), then it might also be possible to sustain
the idea that ‘anyone can make it’ and that if you can not, it is your per-
sonal fault. 
The books also have something to say if you are one of the lucky
ones. Modest people are defined as those who ‘do not descend to be-
coming spoiled because of their social position and prosperity…. God
does not like people who are arrogant and haughty. He does not like
people who make fun of those that are poor or without high social
rank’ (ibid.). Thus the circuit is closed: the impoverished are not to
covet the riches of the affluent because jealousy is a major vice, while
the latter should be modest enough to respect the less lucky ones. 
In both cases, the roots of this inequality are not made the concern of
religion or social morality. Instead practices that allow inequality to
persist without the emergence of social crises or personal reservations
are encouraged: ‘[g]iving of alms is the bridge that connects the rich
and the poor with love’ (ibid.). The same thing is true for the way jus-
tice is conceptualized: ‘[i]n the implementation of rights and justice,
people should not be discriminated with respect to their religion, lan-
guage, m e z h e b, race, richness, or poverty’ (Yı l m a z et al. 1997–9). Thus
justice does not mean the eradication of wealth differentials but
‘equal’ treatment of people without reference to their level of material
well-being. 
C o n c l u s i o n
Universal religion classes in Turkey are a peculiar aspect of the al-
leged secular nature of the state. They have been offered in one form
or another for most of the republican history, and made obligatory
after the military coup in 1982. The study suggests that the generally
held opinion that secularism in Turkey can be more accurately defined
as state control of Islam is valid but can be further elaborated. One way
in which this can be done is by looking at how these books become ter-
rains for other ideologies. They are full of writings on secularism, na-
tionalism, militarism, and a capitalist notion of so-
cietal peace. The reproduction of these ideolo-
gies in connection with Islamic premises provides
them with a sanctity that may not be obtained so
easily otherwise. In other words, Turkish secular-
ism does not only mean state-exercised control
over the meaning of right religion. On the peda-
gogical level, it also operates as a divine legit-
imization for various facets of the official ideolo-
gy. Specifically by taking in the production of reli-
gious knowledge in its sphere, the educational
system is able to make use of a sacred sphere in
promoting nationalism, militarism, and corpo-
ratist capitalism. 
Fifth grade religious studies textbook.
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